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Abstract—In this paper, we present a novel fault injection
framework called PHOEBE for reliability analysis with respect to
system call invocation errors. First, PHOEBE enables developers
to have full observability of system call invocations. Second,
PHOEBE generates error models that are realistic in the sense that
they resemble errors that naturally happen in production. With
the generated error models, PHOEBE automatically conducts
a series of experiments to systematically assess the reliability
of applications with respect to system call invocation errors in
production. We evaluate the effectiveness and runtime overhead
of PHOEBE on two real-world applications in a production envi-
ronment. The results show that PHOEBE successfully generates
realistic error models and is able to detect important reliability
weaknesses with respect to system call invocation errors. To our
knowledge, this novel concept of “realistic error injection”, which
consists of grounding fault injection on production errors, has
never been studied before.
Index Terms—fault injection, error model, system call, chaos
engineering
I. INTRODUCTION
In cloud-based software systems, one cannot fully control
the production execution environment and many unexpected
events keep happening: hardware issues, network fluctuations,
and unanticipated user behavior [29]. In order to assess and
improve the reliability of software systems under such a chang-
ing and imperfect environment, different kinds of techniques
are being researched, in particular fault injection [36]. Fault
injection evaluates software reliability by actively injecting
errors into the software system under study [52]. A recent
trend in fault injection consists of injecting faults in production
directly [4], [8], [51], this is known in the industry as “chaos
engineering”. In this paper, we use “chaos engineering” as
a timely and short term for referring to fault injection in
production.
It is known that the space of all possible error injection is
large [5]. In other words, it is potentially intractable to explore
all possible error scenarios. When doing fault injection in
production, one does not want to impact users with unrealistic
errors. In this paper, we address the problem of defining a
tractable error injection space, by exclusively focusing on
realistic errors. Our novel definition of realistic errors is that
the injected errors resemble the ones that naturally happen in
production. By injecting realistic errors, we identify reliability
issues that are more relevant for developers.
In this paper, we realize this idea in the realm of system call
errors. This focus is motivated by the essential role of system
calls to analyze software behavior [16], and by the significant
number of invocations to system calls that naturally fail in
production. We propose a novel fault injection framework
called PHOEBE, for doing realistic error injection at the system
call level. To define realistic errors, PHOEBE first observes
the natural system call invocation errors which happen in a
production system. Then it analyzes those previously observed
errors to synthesize a series of realistic error injection models
that systematically amplify natural errors. The synthesis of
those realistic injection models is the key novelty of PHOEBE.
To sum, PHOEBE aims at bringing valuable insights into the
error handling capabilities of an application with respect to
realistic system call invocation errors.
We evaluate PHOEBE with two real-world applications:
Hedwig, an email server that uses the SMTP and IMAP
protocols, and TTorrent, a file downloading client based on the
BitTorrent protocol. During the experiments in a production
environment, PHOEBE observes that 84 million invocations to
23 unique system calls naturally fail. Based on these errors,
PHOEBE synthesizes 32 and 33 realistic error injection models
for HedWig and TTorrent respectively. The generated error
models are then used to perform a series of chaos engineering
experiments, which reveal important reliability shortcomings
in both applications. The results of these experiments demon-
strate the feasibility, applicability and added value of PHOEBE
for analyzing reliability against system call invocation errors.
To sum up, our contributions are the following.
• Original insights about the presence of naturally happen-
ing system call errors in software systems.
• The concept of synthesizing realistic error injection mod-
els for system calls based on amplifying naturally hap-
pening errors observed in production.
• A fault injection framework called PHOEBE that imple-
ments the concept. PHOEBE takes as input the generated
error models, conducts chaos engineering fault injection
experiments, and outputs a reliability assessment with
respect to system call invocation errors. The system is
made publicly available for future research in this area at
http://bit.ly/anonymous-phoebe.
• An empirical evaluation of PHOEBE on two real-world
applications, an email server and a file downloading
client, totaling 20.3K lines of code. The results show
that PHOEBE is able to inject realistic errors at runtime,
in production, with low overhead, in order to detect
error handling weaknesses with respect to system call
invocation errors.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
introduces the background. Section III shows that system call
invocations do naturally fail. Section IV and Section V present
the design and evaluation of PHOEBE. Section VI discusses the
runtime overhead of PHOEBE and the threats to the validity
of this research work. Section VII presents the related work,
and Section VIII summarizes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Observability in Software Systems
A software system is said to be observable if it is possible
to analyze the system’s internal state on the basis of its
external behavior [33]. For example, by observing an HTTP
500 response code instead of 200, developers are able to know
that there are some errors in the system when handling an
HTTP request. In the context of errors, observability relates
to the ability of detecting when an error naturally occurs in a
software system. In this case, observability helps developers to
evaluate the system’s error detection and handling capabilities.
There are mainly three categories of observability tech-
niques [43]: 1) logging the system’s internal state. For ex-
ample, using Exception.printStackTrace() method
in Java to log stack information when an exception occurs.
2) monitoring metrics exposed by a system. For example,
monitoring the memory usage of an application in order to de-
tect memory leak issues. and 3) tracing externally observable
events. For example, tracing an HTTP request that propagates
through micro-services for timeout-related bug analysis.
B. Software Fault Injection
Software fault injection refers to a family of techniques for
reliability evaluation [36]. By actively injecting errors into
a software system, the error handling code in the system is
triggered and its effectiveness can be evaluated. For example,
memory errors can be injected to evaluate the reliability of an
operating system with respect to memory errors [20]. Another
example consists of injecting Java exceptions to evaluate the
reliability of the try-catch blocks of a Java application [51].
An error injection model is a precise description of the
injected errors, containing: 1) the kind of injected error, 2)
how many and how frequently errors are injected, and 3) the
time frame when errors are injecting.
Chaos engineering is a recent fault injection technique,
which injects faults in production in order to improve a
system’s reliability [8]. Chaos engineering has been exten-
sively studied with respect to fault injection related to the
environment: server crashes [2], disk issues [34] and network
fluctuations [12]. In chaos engineering, the injected faults are
called “perturbations” or “turbulence”. In order to verify a
software system’s ability to resist these perturbations, chaos
engineering actively injects errors into the production system
and observe the visible effects on the system [3].
C. System Calls
System call is a fundamental interface between an applica-
tion and the kernel [46]. In modern operating systems, critical
resources such as hardware devices and process scheduling are
usually managed by the kernel. When a user application needs
to interact with a given critical resource, the corresponding
system call is invoked. For example, in Linux, the open
system call is invoked when an application needs to open
or create a file. Linux defines and implements more than
300 unique system calls, as well as over 100 error codes to
precisely report on errors upon invocation of those system
calls [45].
As discussed in Section II-B, an application may be per-
turbed by both hardware errors and software errors. Sometimes
such errors can not be handled by the operating system on
its own. Thus it propagates the error to the application, by
failing a system call invocation with an error code. System call
invocation errors do happen naturally, which will be further
explained in the following section.
III. NATURAL SYSTEM CALL INVOCATION ERRORS
Due to the complexity of execution environments in produc-
tion, there are always unanticipated errors in a software system
[8], [12]. For instance, it is known that servers do regularly
crash in production [10]. In this paper, we focus on system
call errors, which is a topic that has been little studied. In this
section, we present original empirical observations that show
that system call invocation errors naturally happen oftentimes.
A. Methodology
We use the mature and well-known Java-based web server
Apache Tomcat 9 as the experiment target. After deploying
Tomcat into a production-like environment, we simulate 10
users who keep sending requests concurrently to the server
for 1 minute. During this execution, a system call monitor is
attached to Tomcat to capture all system call invocations. The
monitor records both the system call and its return code. At
last, we analyze this monitored information to see if there are
any system call invocation errors naturally happening.
B. Magnitude of System Call Invocation Errors in the Wild
During the experiment, there are a total of 700, 000 requests
sent to the Tomcat server in one minute. All of them are
responded with a 200 HTTP status code (success) and the
corresponding web page is well sent. Global observations
about system call invocations are as follow: there are 20 unique
system calls, and a total of 18.4 million invocations. Most
interestingly for us, there 85.4K system call invocation errors.
Despite that 0.46% of system call invocations return an error
code, Tomcat still successfully fulfills all the HTTP requests,
thanks to its error-handling code.
Table I provides some detailed insights about those errors.
During sending the requests to Tomcat, 5/20 system calls
failed at least once. Each row in the table describes one system
call invocation error, including its error code, the number of
errors, the number of total invocations of this system call, and
the percentage of errors. Let’s take the third row as an example.
futex is typically used as a blocking construct in the context
of shared-memory synchronization. During the experiment,
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TABLE I
NATURAL SYSTEM CALL INVOCATION ERRORS HAPPENING DURING 1
MIN. OF HTTP REQUESTS ON TOMCAT 9
System Call Error Code Errors Total Invoc. Natural
error rate
1 epoll_ctl ENOENT 253 1.40M 0.018%
2 futex EAGAIN 83.1K 2.78M 3.0%3 futex ETIMEDOUT 1.73K 0.062%
4 lstat ENOENT 15 244 6.1%
5 stat ENOENT 282 1.43K 20%
6 other syscalls - 0 18.3M 0%
7 ALL - 85.4K 18.4M 0.46%
1.73K out of 2.78M (0.062%) futex invocations fail with
an error code ETIMEDOUT. The error code ETIMEDOUT
means that the invocation employs a timeout specified as an
argument, and the timeout expires before the operation is
completed [47]. This indicates that despite the timeout of the
operation, there is no critical or even visible impact on the
application.
To sum up, we have shown that system call invocation
errors naturally happen, even for a usage scenario as simple
as requesting a file via HTTP. Those errors are handled
somewhere in the software stack, either in a library, in the
JVM, or in the code of Tomcat, yet no error or degradation is
to be observed by the users. In this paper, our idea is to amplify
those system call invocation errors to identify the boundaries
of this resilience envelope. As we will see in the next section,
PHOEBE generates realistic error injection models based on
those errors that are naturally observed.
IV. DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION OF PHOEBE
A. Working Example
As discussed in Section III, system call invocation errors
indeed happen in production. Although system call invocation
errors naturally occur, it may take a long time to observe a
specific type of rare error. Similarly, the observed behavior
may not be sufficient to analyze reliability against these natural
errors.
In order to bring more insights about how an application
behaves when a system call invocation error occurs, PHOEBE
follows the principles of chaos engineering to actively inject
system call invocation errors into an application running in
production.
First of all, PHOEBE provides observability on system calls.
It collects system call invocations including their name, exe-
cution time and return code, with low overhead. By achieving
the full observability at the system call level, PHOEBE enables
analysis of natural system call invocation errors.
Secondly, PHOEBE captures rare system call invocation
errors and makes them happen more frequently. This can
be considered as chaos engineering for system calls (per the
definition of Section II-B), PHOEBE provides the developers
with information about the behavior of the system under
system call perturbations. If the application’s behavior is ac-
ceptable under fault injection, the developers gain confidence
in the application’s error handling capabilities. Otherwise, with
the help of PHOEBE, developers learn more about how the
application behaves when system calls fail, and can fix the
uncovered reliability issues.
B. Definitions
a) System Call Invocation Error: An invocation of a
system call is deemed an error if it returns an error code [46].
These error codes are systemically specified and documented
in the operating system under consideration, Linux in our case.
In Linux, the error codes are negative values defined in a
header file named errno.h [45]. In this paper, an invocation
to a given system call syscall yielding a given error code
E is denoted by syscall:E.
b) Monitoring Interval: A monitoring interval is a period
of time along which metrics of interest are collected. The
length t of a monitoring interval in seconds means that
PHOEBE collects metrics over t seconds, and reports them
to an external component such as a time-series database every
t seconds. The smaller t is, the more frequently the monitor
reports the metrics.
c) Error Rate: An error rate r of a system call invocation
error s : e during the length of monitoring interval i is denoted
as r(s, e, i). The value of r(s, e, i) is calculated as
r(s, e, p) =
number_of_errors(s, e, i)
total_number_of_invocations(s, i)
where number_of_errors(s, e, i) means the total number of
errors s : e in i. total_number_of_invocations(s, i) records
the total number of invocations of system call s made in i no
matter what a return code is.
d) Realistic Error Injection Model: In this paper, an error
injection model is a triple (s, e, r) that states what invocation
error s : e is injected, with an error rate of r. An error model
is considered as realistic if the error s : e is naturally observed
in a production-like running environment.
e) Behavioral Assessment Criteria (BAC): The normal
behavior of a software system consists of functionalities that
can be successfully executed by users [16]. In this paper,
we define the “Behavioral Assessment Criteria” as a set of
application-specific metrics that capture the normal behavior
and potential deviations from the perspective of users. The
series of metric values observed in the absence of perturbations
forms the normal behavior. The longer we observe these
metrics, the more accurately the normality of the behavior is
assessed. An application’s normal behavior is often described
at the application level, with application specific metrics: for
instance, Netflix uses metric SPS – stream starts per second
– as their major metric for capturing the normal behavior of
their video streaming system [8].
f) Chaos Engineering Experiment: In this paper, a
“chaos engineering experiment” is a consecutive sequence
of monitoring intervals during which system call invocation
errors are actively injected in production according to a given
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error injection model. The goal of a chaos engineering exper-
iment is to analyze to which extent the injected errors make
the system deviate from its behavioral assessment criteria in
production.
C. Architecture of PHOEBE
Figure 1 shows the architecture of PHOEBE, there are
six components in PHOEBE: 1) natural error monitor (see
Section IV-D1), 2) application behavior monitor (see Sec-
tion IV-D2), 3) realistic error injection model synthesizer
(see Section IV-D3), 4) system call invocation error injector
(see Section IV-D4), 5) experiment orchestrator (see Sec-
tion IV-D5) and 6) metrics visualizer (see Section IV-D6).
Briefly, those components work as follows. The natural
error monitor collects and reports system call related met-
rics, those metrics are inputs for the error injection model
synthesizer. The synthesizer analyzes the natural system call
errors and computes a realistic error injection model. The
system call invocation error injector takes an error model as
input, and conducts a set of chaos engineering experiments
on the application. The experiment flow is automated by the
experiment orchestrator. Finally, the metric visualizer provides
a live dashboard for the developer to display the monitoring
information.
D. Component Design
1) Natural Error Monitoring: The natural error monitor
captures metrics related to system calls. Given a monitoring
interval length t, the monitor regularly captures a set of metrics
including 1) the name and amount of different system call
invocations during t, 2) the return code e of system call
invocations, 3) the execution time l of each system call and
4) the error rate r if a specific system call invocation fails.
Per our definition of a monitoring interval in Section IV-B,
the choice of a length t for the monitoring interval results from
an engineering trade-off. A smaller t gives a more accurate
description of metric changes thanks to a more frequent
sampling. However, this brings more monitoring overhead with
respect to performance and storage. For example, a small
interval (e.g., 1 second) makes the monitor report metrics very
frequently: lots of monitoring data is generated, which requires
significant calculation and storage resources. Meanwhile, a
large interval length (e.g. 1800 seconds) leads to more sparse
monitoring data, which gives less accurate information about
errors. Per our pilot experiment, t = 15 seconds is a good
trade-off between overhead and precision, this is PHOEBE’s
default monitoring interval length.
2) Application Behavior Monitoring: PHOEBE collects a
set of behavioral assessment criteria to model the application
behavior. The criteria combine general metrics, language-
specific metrics and application-specific monitoring metrics
which capture the normal behavior: 1) general metrics:
PHOEBE captures OS-level metrics such as CPU load 2)
runtime-specific: PHOEBE has dedicated support for Java
and captures heap memory usage, garbage collection time
3) application-specific metrics: PHOEBE can capture HTTP
requests for certain Java libraries. The developers can define
more behavior monitoring, for example, the ratio of successful
database requests per second can be considered as a metric for
an enterprise applications.
Both language-specific and application-specific behavior
monitoring requires observability features that are specific to
an execution environment. In particular, they require code
instrumentation. The current prototype implementation of
PHOEBE supports software systems that are running on a Java
Virtual Machine with support for JVM metrics and bytecode
instrumentation.
3) Realistic Error Model Synthesis: There are many differ-
ent error codes for each system call. In principle, it is possible
to inject all possible error codes for all system calls. However,
this is very time consuming, and some combinations never
happen in the real world. In order to increase the efficiency and
relevance of chaos engineering experiments, the error model
synthesizer focuses on errors that occur naturally. It takes the
observed natural errors as input, and generates a set of realistic
error injection models for chaos engineering experiments.
Recall that an error injection model is a triple (s, e, r), in
which s stands for the system call, e means the error code
of a system call invocation, and r is the error rate. Given
an observed system call s that failed with error code e, the
synthesizer keeps s and e, and generates different rate values
by applying an error rate amplification algorithm which is
described in Algorithm 1. For each system call invocation
error, we consider four different cases:
Case 1: sporadic errors (condition at line 5) The natural
error rate is very low: this means that it takes a very long time
to observe such an error naturally. In this case, the synthesized
error injection model uses a fixed error rate, large enough to
inject the error during the experiment, with high probability.
For example, if the natural error rate for system call S with
error code E is 0.000001, this error is difficult to be observed
in a normal running environment. Thus the synthesizer ampli-
fies it to a fixed value, e.g., 0.5 (configurable by the developer).
This means that during a fault injection experiment, an invo-
cation of system call S has a 50% possibility to be failed with
error code E.
Case 2: fluctuating errors (condition at line 9) PHOEBE
observes a big difference between the maximum and minimum
error rate over different monitoring intervals. In this case, the
synthesizer sets the rate of the model to the maximum error
rate.
For example, system call S fails with error code E several
times during a consecutive sequence of monitoring intervals.
The minimum error rate in a monitoring interval is 0.01 and
the error rate in another interval is 0.5. This means that system
call S sometimes fails once for every 100 invocations or for
half of such system call invocations. The synthesizer set the
error rate to 0.5 in the model. During a chaos engineering
experiment, invocations to this S always have the highest
possibility of error.
Case 3: steady errors (“else” statement at line 11) The
maximum and minimum error rate over a consecutive se-
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Fig. 1. Architecture of PHOEBE: it collects system calls in production and perturbs them in a realistic way, in order to produce a valuable reliability assessment.
quence of monitoring intervals are close to each other, and
the rate is higher than a threshold. This means that an error
happens often, can be easily observed and can be easily
injected. In this case, the synthesizer multiplies the maximum
original error rate by a fixed amplification factor 1 < f < 2.
For example, an amplification rate f = 1.2 means that there
are 20% more such errors compared to what happens naturally.
Case 4: worst case (statement at line 16) for all system
call invocation errors, PHOEBE also generates a worst-case
error injection model: for every observed error type, one model
is generated with maximal of 100% (all invocations to that
system call fail). This lets developers see how an application
behaves in a catastrophic scenario.
Note that in PHOEBE, the minimum, mean and maximum
error rates are calculated from a consecutive sequence of
monitoring intervals. Considering there may be extreme cases
in production that make the minimum and maximum values
deviate a lot from the others, the Algorithm 1 takes the 5th
percentile and 95th percentile respectively as the minimum
and maximum error rate.
4) System Call Invocation Error Injection: In order to
trigger a specific system call invocation error, the error injector
in PHOEBE instruments the system call invocations. The
concrete workflow includes: 1) registering the injector to the
target system call’s return event, 2) calculating the injection
conditions before the target system call invocation returns, and
3) overriding the system call return value if all the conditions
have been met. The system call invocation error injector
supports the following triggering conditions: Process id and
process name The injector focuses on an application’s process.
When the injector is registered to a system call exit event,
the injector uses the process id or the process name to select
all system call invocations of that process. Error rate The
injector triggers an error according to the error rate specified
in an error injection model. Before a target system call returns,
the injector generates a random number p (0 < p ≤ 1) and
compares it with the error rate r. This condition holds when
p is less than or equal to r. Total number of errors The
Algorithm 1 Realistic Error Injection Model Synthesis
Input:
System call monitoring metrics in a consecutive sequence
of monitoring intervals L;
An upper boundary for using fixed error rate b;
A vector that contains fixed error rates for rare system
calls v;
Amplification factor f ;
Output:
A list of error injection models F ;
1: L′ ← Categorize L by system call s and return code e;
2: L′ ← Calculate the minimum (5th percentile), mean and
maximum (95th percentile) value per monitoring interval
of each (s, e)’s error rate;
3: F ← ∅
4: for each system call invocation error (s, e, r) ∈ L′ do
5: if rmax < b then
6: for each fixed error rate r ∈ v do
7: F ← F ∪ gerenateErrorModel(s, e, r);
8: end for
9: else if rmax/rmin > 10 then
10: F ← F ∪ gerenateErrorModel(s, e, rmax);
11: else
12: if rmax ∗ f < 1 then
13: F ← F ∪ gerenateErrorModel(s, e, rmax ∗ f);
14: end if
15: end if
16: F ← F∪ gerenateErrorModel(s,e,1);
17: end for
18: return L′;
injector injects an error within a specific absolute amount of
system call invocation errors. Successful calls only The injector
only injects errors on invocations that are initially successful.
Natural system call errors are untouched and their return code
remains the same.
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5) Orchestration: The experiment orchestrator in PHOEBE
is designed to conduct fault innjection experiments in a fully
automatic manner. The orchestrator takes an experiment con-
figuration file format as input. The configuration file contains
a set of experiments, each specified by a duration and an
error injection model as defined in Section IV-B. For each
experiment, the orchestrator attaches the error injector with
its error model, capturing the application’s behavior with the
help of the application behavior monitor, and comparing the
behavior under fault injection according to the behavioral
assessment criteria. When the experiment duration has passed,
the orchestrator turns off the injector and outputs the experi-
ment result.
6) Visualization: In order to fetch and analyze the moni-
toring information, developers are given a metric visualization
dashboard. This dashboard displays metrics in line charts so
that it is convenient to investigate the change of different
system call invocations. These line charts include every system
call’s error rate and the number of invocations over time. For
other metrics such as the number of system call invocations,
developers can also directly make queries to the monitoring
database via the dashboard.
E. Implementation
PHOEBE captures and overrides system calls with the
BPF Linux Kernel module [44]. PHOEBE’s BPF programs
are loaded with BCC [1]. PHOEBE’s monitoring infrastruc-
ture and system call invocation error injector are imple-
mented in Python. All the monitoring metrics are saved into
Prometheus [38], a time series database. The visualization
component is supported by Grafana [18], an open source
visualization platform. For the sake of open research, the
source code and experiment results of PHOEBE are publicly-
available at http://bit.ly/anonymous-phoebe.
V. EVALUATION
This section discusses the evaluation of PHOEBE, which
focuses on what reliability problems can be detected by
injecting system call invocation errors using a realistic error
model.
A. Subject Programs
In order to evaluate PHOEBE, a set of representative pro-
grams needs to be selected. The selection criteria are based
on: 1) the program is a real-world project that has users (it is
neither a research prototype nor specifically implemented for
this evaluation), 2) the program is medium-sized so that it can
be deployed using the computing resources that are available
in the research lab, 3) there is a production workload or equiv-
alent that can be used for the chaos engineering experiments,
4) the subject must be monitorable with PHOEBE’s behavioral
monitoring component for Java (see Section IV-D2). Based
on those systematic criteria, we select 2 projects for the
experiments: 1) HedWig1, an email server written in Java; 2)
TTorrent2, a client for downloading files using the BitTorrent
1http://hwmail.sourceforge.net/
2https://github.com/mpetazzoni/ttorrent
protocol, implemented in Java.
B. Experiment Protocol
For both case studies, we follow a 4-step protocol, described
below. In the following subsections, we go into the details of
how we specialize these steps, according to the application-
specific production-like workload and the behavioral assess-
ment criteria for each subject program, in order to trigger
different execution paths in the program.
First, we build a realistic error injection model by observing
natural system call errors (per our definition in Section IV-B).
To this end, PHOEBE’s monitor component is attached to the
program to collect system call related metrics without any
error injection.
Secondly, PHOEBE’s error injection model synthesizer takes
the monitored system call information as input. It generates a
set of error injection models for chaos engineering experiment.
Thirdly, the behavioral assessment criteria of the program
is set up based on the monitoring metrics. The experiment
orchestrator conducts error injection experiments defined in
Section IV-B on the program according to the generated error
injection models.
At last, the program behavior under error injection is
evaluated using the behavioral assessment criteria. A report
is generated to show different impacts each error injection has
on the program.
C. Experiment on HedWig
1) Experiment Specificities for HedWig: We use version 0.7
of HedWig for the experiments. We collect a real workload
for our experiments, as follows: we create an email account,
to receive emails from real-world mailing lists; we let the
email server run for 90 days. As a result, 351 emails with
different headers and bodies are collected. These emails and
the observed server behavior form the experimental dataset.
In order to define the behavioral assessment criteria of
HedWig server, we deploy a domain specific health checker.
It executes the following workflow: 1) the checker logs into
the server using one test account, 2) the checker randomly
picks up an email from the dataset, and forwards it to another
test account hosted on the server, 3) the checker logs into the
server again using the latter account and tries to fetch the latest
email, and 4) the checker compares the fetched email with the
original sent email to test if the email is correctly delivered.
After running the health checker for 24 hours, we collect
the following behavioral assessment criteria: the percentages
of success (SU), sending errors (SF), fetching errors (FF),
validation errors (VF), and server crashes (SC).
Considering that the HedWig server may not be able to
correctly deliver emails even after error injection has stopped,
we collect an additional Boolean metric called state corruption
(CO) during the experiments. The CO metric is calculated by
a post inspection step for each experiment: after the error
injector is turned off, a randomly selected email is sent,
fetched, and validated as usual to test if the server is back
to working normally. If the post inspection fails, CO is true.
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TABLE II
THE OBSERVED NATURAL ERRORS FOR HEDWIG IN 24 HOURS
Syscall and Error Code Count Error Rate (min, mean, max) Case
per 15 sec period
accept:EAGAIN 1.91K 0.200000, 0.363276, 0.500000 3,4
connect:ENOENT 151 0.090909, 0.237583, 1.000000 2,4
epoll_ctl:ENOENT 1.91K 0.500000, 0.511280, 0.500000 3,4
futex:EAGAIN 395 0.000032, 0.000056, 0.000133 1,4
futex:ETIMEDOUT 83.1M 0.469822, 0.478421, 0.483754 3,4
lstat:ENOENT 2 0.062500, 0.062500, 0.062500 1,4
mkdir:ENOENT 1 0.333333, 0.333333, 0.333333 3,4
read:EAGAIN 13.3K 0.035533, 0.148000, 0.225806 1,4
recvfrom:ECONNRESET 1 0.004717, 0.004717, 0.004717 1,4
sendto:ECONNRESET 1 0.037037, 0.037037, 0.037037 1,4
sendto:EPIPE 1 0.009524, 0.009524, 0.009524 1,4
shutdown:ENOTCONN 1 0.500000, 0.500000, 0.500000 3,4
stat:ENOENT 11.5K 0.025641, 0.053756, 0.102041 1,4
In this case the server needs to be restarted before conducting
other experiments.
2) Experimental Results: Table II lists the natural errors
observed by PHOEBE’s monitor over a period of 24 hours, or
5760 monitoring intervals of 15 seconds. Each row in the table
describes how many invocations (count) to a given system call
yielded a given error code. The minimum (5th percentile) and
maximum (95th percentile) error rates, encountered in those
5760 monitoring intervals are also reported, as well as the
mean error rates, averaged over those intervals. The data in this
table is one of the inputs (system call monitoring metrics L)
for Algorithm 1. The last column reports on how our algorithm
categorizes each entry in the table (Section IV-D3).
For example, the second row of the table shows that the error
type connect:ENOENT occurred 151 times during the 24
hours under monitoring. The minimum error rate encountered
in a 15 seconds monitoring interval for that specific error was
0.090909, the maximum rate was 1. The mean error rate was
0.237583. In this case, there is a large gap between the mini-
mum rate and the maximum rate, which indicates that in some
monitoring intervals HedWig invokes connect system calls
and most of them are successful. While in other monitoring
intervals, the percentage of failed connect system calls with
ENOENT is higher. Thus this case meets the conditions of
case 2 and case 4 defined in Section IV-D3. The minimum
and maximum error rates for error type futex:ETIMEDOUT
are comparatively very close to each other: in most monitoring
intervals, we always observe about half of futex system calls
fail.
Table II also shows different patterns of natural system call
invocation errors. Some natural errors rarely happen in 24
hours, such as mkdir with ENOENT which only fails once.
While some natural errors are frequent, for example futex
with ETIMEDOUT.
We build the behavioral assessment criteria of Hedwig as
follows. The health checker tries to send 3824 randomly
selected emails from one account to another. We observe the
following metrics: 3821 out of 3824 emails are successfully
sent, fetched and validated; all the 3824 emails are successfully
sent, SU=100% and SF=0%; 1 fetching error is reported,
FF=0.026%; 2 validation errors are reported, VF=0.052%;
there is no server crash reported, SC=0%. These metrics form
TABLE III
CHAOS ENGINEERING EXPERIMENT RESULTS ON HEDWIG
Target & Error F. Rate Inj. Behavioral Assessment Criteria
accept:EAG. 0.75 27 SU:18.8%, SF:56.2%, FF:25.0% -
accept:EAG. 1.0 55 SF:97.0%, FF:3.0% -
connect:ENO. 1.0 54 FF:100% -
epoll_ctl:ENO. 0.75 7 SU:100%
√
epoll_ctl:ENO. 1.0 9 SU:100%
√
futex:EAG. 0.5 1.33K SC:100% !
futex:EAG. 0.75 355 SC:100% !
futex:EAG. 1.0 2.31K SC:100% !
futex:ETI. 0.726 103 SC:100% !
futex:ETI. 1.0 2.34K SC:100% !
read:EAG. 0.5 57.3M FF:100%, CO:T !
read:EAG. 0.75 94.7M FF:100%, CO:T !
read:EAG. 1.0 124M FF:100%, CO:T !
recvfrom:ECO. 0.5 14 SU:33.3%, FF:55.6%, VF:11.1% -
recvfrom:ECO. 0.75 147 SF:97.0%, FF:3.0%, CO:T !
recvfrom:ECO. 1.0 147 SF:97.1%, FF:2.9%, CO:T !
sendto:ECO. 0.5 392 SF:98.8%, FF:1.2% -
sendto:ECO. 0.75 541 SF:98.8%, FF:1.2% -
sendto:ECO. 1.0 685 SF:98.8%, FF:1.2% -
sendto:EPI. 0.5 428 SF:95.5%, FF:4.5%, CO:T !
sendto:EPI. 0.75 701 SF:98.8%, FF:1.2% -
sendto:EPI. 1.0 873 SF:98.8%, FF:1.2%, CO:T !
shutdown:ENOT. 0.75 6 SU:100%
√
shutdown:ENOT. 1.0 9 SU:100%
√
the behavioral assessment criteria that we use for a comparison
during each chaos engineering experiment.
Next, we synthesize realistic error models. The inputs for
Algorithm 1 are, the system call monitoring metrics L =
Table II , upper boundary error rate b = 0.3, a vector of fixed
error rates (0.5, 0.75) and amplification factor f = 1.5. The
algorithm synthesizes 32 error models for chaos engineering
experiments. Table III describes 24 error models together with
their experimental results. We omit 8 error models for which
PHOEBE did not inject any errors during the experiments. The
potential reason is production workload during the experiments
does not invoke these system calls.
Table III is the main outcome of the chaos engineering
experiments on HedWig. For example, the first row of Table III
is a realistic error injection model based on the natural
invocation error accept:EAGAIN (row 1 in Table II) which
meets case 3 in Section IV-D3. During the experiment with
error rate 0.75, PHOEBE injects 27 errors in total into the
system calls, in addition to the natural ones. 18.8% of emails
were successfully sent, fetched and verified. However, these
errors caused sending errors for 56.2% of emails and fetching
errors for 25% of emails. There was no validation error or
server crash detected. The post inspection for this experiment
passed, which means the injected errors do not impact the
server after the injection has been stopped. Considering the
behavioral assessment criteria of HedWig mentioned above,
failing invocations to accept do cause a negative impact on
HedWig’s functionalities.
The results of these chaos engineering experiments bring
insights about how HedWig server behaves under different
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operating system perturbations. Based on the impact of a
system call invocation error on Hedwig, the experiment results
are categorized into three types: 1) an injected system call
invocation error does not violate any behavior assessment
criterion, is marked as “
√
” in the table, 2) an injected error
has an impact on the functionality only during error injection
(SF, FF and VF related violations), this is marked as “ - ”, and
3) an injected error causes severe side effects like server crash
(SC) or server state corruption (CO), this is marked as “ ! ”.
For example, futex related errors may lead the server to
crash. Failing invocations to read, recvfrom and sentdo
can corrupt the application’s running state and have a long-
existing impact after an error happens. These categories of
system call invocation errors are helpful to guide developers
to design specific error handling mechanisms with respect to
system call invocation errors.
D. Experiment on TTorrent
1) Experiment Specificities for TTorrent: We use version
2.0 of TTorrent for the experiments. As TTorrent uses BitTor-
rent protocol to download files from the Internet, its workload
during file downloading can be considered as a production-
like workload. To make the workload more various, TTorrent
randomly downloads ubuntu-18.04.4, ubuntu-19.10, or ubuntu-
20.04 using different torrent files for each experiment. Ac-
cording to the network condition and the experiment virtual
machine’s power, the average time of downloading one of
the iso files in the data set is about 30 seconds. For each
experiment, the orchestrator adds a 150 seconds time out for
the TTorrent process. If TTorrent is still running but the file
is not downloaded after 150 seconds, the orchestrator kills the
TTorrent process and begins the next round of download.
We run TTorrent to randomly download different Ubuntu
distributions for 24 hours without injecting errors, to determine
its behavioral assessment criteria and observe the natural
occurrences of system call invocation errors. Our key metric
for the behavioral assessment criteria is the percentage of
executions that successfully download files. When system
call invocation errors are injected, TTorrent might behave in
the following ways: 1) SU (success): TTorrent successfully
downloads the target file, with a correct md5 checksum. This
means TTorrent still meets the behavioral assessment criteria
when the errors are injected. 2) VF (validation error): TTorrent
downloads the file, but the file’s checksum is incorrect. This
means a data corruption happens during the downloading
process. 3) ST (stalled) TTorrent fails to download the file in
a limited time, which is considered as stalled. The experiment
orchestrator kills the TTorrent process and starts another round
of experiment. 4) CR (crash): TTorrent directly crashes when
an error is injected.
Since TTorrent is a client-side application, each chaos en-
gineering experiment with TTorrent initializes a new process.
There is no need to add post inspections for each experiment.
2) Experimental Results: A 24-hour (563 separate execu-
tions in total) run of TTorrent to download different versions
of Ubuntu distributions, shows that 547 out of 563 executions
TABLE IV
THE OBSERVED NATURAL ERRORS OF TTORRENT WHEN DOWNLOADING
A UBUNTU DISTRIBUTION ISO FILE
Syscall and Error Code Count Error Rate (min, mean, max) Case
per 15 sec period
access:ENOENT 3.67K 0.549091, 0.574295, 0.666667 3,4
connect:EINPROGRESS 13.5K 0.500000, 0.917268, 1.000000 3,4
connect:ENOENT 1.05K 0.070175, 0.553496, 1.000000 2,4
epoll_ctl:ENOENT 6.88K 0.000030, 0.189846, 1.000000 2,4
epoll_wait:EINTR 79 0.333333, 0.753165, 1.000000 3,4
futex:EAGAIN 182K 0.001515, 0.008186, 0.017777 1,4
futex:ETIMEDOUT 666K 0.004235, 0.348340, 0.500000 2,4
getsockname:ENOTSOCK 262 0.009804, 0.178715, 0.333333 2,4
lstat:ENOENT 786 0.024390, 0.025239, 0.025862 1,4
mkdir:EEXIST 262 1.000000, 1.000000, 1.000000 3,4
openat:ENOENT 13.1K 0.135187, 0.234193, 0.342857 3,4
read:EAGAIN 478 0.000007, 0.000034, 0.000097 1,4
read:ECONNRESET 763 0.000007, 0.036329, 0.125000 1,4
stat:ENOENT 17.0K 0.114286, 0.387320, 0.571429 3,4
unlink:ENOENT 362 0.666667, 0.668508, 0.666667 3,4
write:ECONNRESET 58 0.000016, 0.000719, 0.001954 1,4
write:EPIPE 6 0.000017, 0.000023, 0.000031 1,4
successfully download the target file with a correct MD5
checksum, SU=97.2%. The other 16 executions all lead to
a stalled state, ST=2.8%. There is no validation error or
crash detected, VF=CR=0%. PHOEBE’s natural error monitor
collects 17 different system calls that naturally fail. They
are summarized in Table IV. Each row in the table records
one system call invocation error, including its system call
name, error code, the total number of errors, the minimum
(5th percentile), mean, maximum (95th percentile) value of
the error rate per monitoring interval (15 seconds), and its
corresponding cases for error model synthesis described in
Section IV-D3.
For example, we observe 3.67K access system call invo-
cation errors with an error code ENOENT, over the 563 rounds
of execution. The minimum, mean and maximum error rate
per monitoring interval are respectively 0.549091, 0.574295
and 0.66667. This indicates that in some monitoring intervals,
55% of the invocations to access fail with ENOENT. In some
other monitoring intervals, more than 66% of the invocations
to access fail with such an error code.
PHOEBE synthesizes 33 realistic error injection models for
chaos engineering experiments. The upper boundary error rate
b = 0.3, the vector of fixed error rates is (0.5, 0.75) and the
amplification factor f = 1.5. The generated error models and
the corresponding experiment results are presented in Table V.
Similar to Table III, the rows where the injection count is zero
are omitted as well. The experiment results are categorized into
3 types: 1) TTorrent successfully downloads the file with a
correct checksum under error injection (SU), which is marked
as “
√
” in the table, 2) TTorrent gets stalled when an error is
injected (ST), which is marked as “ - ”, 3) TTorrent reports
the file is downloaded but the checksum of the file is incorrect
(VF), or TTorrent immediately crashes after injecting an error
(CR), which is marked as “ ! ”.
PHOEBE was able to highlight the fact that TTorrent has dif-
ferent levels of reliability against different system call invoca-
tion errors. For example, TTorrent is fully resilient against er-
rors of types epoll_ctl:ENOENT, epoll_wait:EINTR
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TABLE V
CHAOS ENGINEERING EXPERIMENT RESULTS ON TTORRENT
Target & Error F. Rate Inj. Behavioral Assessment Criteria
access:ENO. 1.0 119 SU:0, VF:0, ST:0, CR:100% !
connect:EIN. 1.0 144 SU:0, VF:0, ST:100%, CR:0 -
connect:ENO. 1.0 144 SU:0, VF:0, ST:100%, CR:0 -
epoll_ctl:ENO. 1.0 1.21MSU:100%, VF:0, ST:0, CR:0
√
epoll_wait:EINTR 1.0 22.1MSU:100%, VF:0, ST:0, CR:0
√
futex:EAG. 0.5 178 SU:13.5%, VF:0, ST:0, CR:86.5% !
futex:EAG. 0.75 234 SU:0, VF:0, ST:0, CR:100% !
futex:EAG. 1.0 399 SU:0, VF:0, ST:0, CR:100% !
futex:ETI. 0.5 286 SU:0, VF:0, ST:0, CR:100% !
futex:ETI. 1.0 271 SU:0, VF:0, ST:0, CR:100% !
getsockname:ENOT. 0.333 152 SU:62.5%, VF:0, ST:37.5%, CR:0 -
getsockname:ENOT. 1 4 SU:0, VF:0, ST:100%, CR:0 -
openat:ENO. 0.514 243 SU:0, VF:0, ST:0, CR:100% !
openat:ENO. 1.0 238 SU:0, VF:0, ST:0, CR:100% !
read:EAG. 0.5 120 SU:0, VF:0, ST:0, CR:100% !
read:EAG. 0.75 119 SU:0, VF:0, ST:0, CR:100% !
read:EAG. 1.0 119 SU:0, VF:0, ST:0, CR:100% !
read:ECO. 0.5 119 SU:0, VF:0, ST:0, CR:100% !
read:ECO. 0.75 119 SU:0, VF:0, ST:0, CR:100% !
read:ECO. 1.0 119 SU:0, VF:0, ST:0, CR:100% !
unlink:ENO. 1.0 20 SU:100%, VF:0, ST:0, CR:0
√
write:ECO. 0.5 84 SU:0, VF:0, ST:100%, CR:0 -
write:ECO. 0.75 127 SU:0, VF:0, ST:100%, CR:0 -
write:ECO. 1.0 184 SU:0, VF:0, ST:100%, CR:0 -
write:EPI. 0.5 858 SU:0, VF:0, ST:100%, CR:0 -
write:EPI. 0.75 138 SU:0, VF:0, ST:100%, CR:0 -
write:EPI. 1.0 184 SU:0, VF:0, ST:100%, CR:0 -
and unlink:ENOENT, as shown in rows 4, 5 and 21. In
other words, those errors had no negative impact on the
behavior assessment criteria for TTorrent, which was still able
to download the file under such error injection. However,
TTorrent is particularly sensitive to invocation errors related
to access, futex, openat and read, making TTorrent to
crash instantly. Other types of errors, related to connect,
getsockname and write resulted in TTorrent stalling
and need further investigations to determine if TTorrent can
eventually recover.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Runtime Overhead of PHOEBE
1) Experiment Protocol: Monitoring and injecting system
call invocation errors may impact application performance. We
now measure and discuss the runtime overhead of PHOEBE.
Firstly, we keep an application running in production for a
certain amount of time without PHOEBE attached, and we
record performance-related metrics. Secondly, the application
is executed for the same duration with PHOEBE’s monitor
attached. The same performance metrics are captured. Fi-
nally, the performance difference is analyzed to determine if
PHOEBE has an acceptable runtime overhead.
We collect both generic and application-specific perfor-
mance metrics. The generic metrics are: 1) heap memory
usage in the JVM collected with Glowroot, 2) CPU load.
Since HedWig depends on a MySQL database, the JDBC
transactions are also picked up as an application-specific
TABLE VI
THE RUNTIME OVERHEAD OF PHOEBE’S NATURAL ERROR MONITOR
DURING EXECUTING HEDWIG (H.) AND TTORRENT (T.)
App. Metric Normal Run Monitor On Overh.
H.
Heap Memory Usage 104.6MB 109.8MB 5.0%
CPU Load 1.7% 1.8% 5.9%
Memory Usage per Transaction 837.5 KB 840.9 KB 0.4%
CPU Time per Transaction 20.3 ms 21.8 ms 7.4%
JDBC Query Average Time 0.351 ms 0.379 ms 8.0%
T.
Heap Memory Usage 150.2MB 156.9MB 4.5%
CPU Load 31.9% 32.6% 2.2%
Average Downloading Time 36.8s 38.6s 4.9%
performance metric. For TTorrent, we measure the average
download time.
2) Runtime Overhead Evaluation Results: Table VI shows
the runtime overhead of PHOEBE’s natural error monitor on
HedWig and TTorrent. For example, the first group of rows
in the table shows the 5 metrics captured for HedWig: 1) the
heap memory usage, 2) the CPU load, 3) the memory usage per
database transaction, 4) the CPU time per transaction and 5)
the JDBC query time on average. These 5 metrics respectively
increase by 5.0%, 5.9%, 0.4%, 7.4%, and 8.0% with system
call monitoring, which is considered as acceptable. The same
conclusion applies to TTorrent, where the maximum overhead
is 4.9%.
As a summary, the runtime overhead cost by PHOEBE is
comparable to other monitoring tools for production usage like
Glowroot [17] and SWAT [21].
B. Threats to Validity
A critical bug in PHOEBE that impacts the trustfulness of our
measurements would impact internal validity. Since our code
is open-source, future work and researchers in this domain are
able to verify it.
The behavior assessment criteria are essential for analyzing
the application behavior under fault injection. If we have
missed an application-specific behavior assessment criterion,
this would impact construct validity. However, we are confi-
dent that this is not the case since we understand the domain
of email communication and file downloading.
Finally, PHOEBE focuses on applications running on top of
the Java Virtual Machine because application behavior mon-
itoring requires language- and technology-specific features.
We notice that the JVM itself may 1) either create natural
system call errors 2) or remediate some errors directly (i.e.
we are not observing the effectiveness of application-specific
reliability). Future work may explore the interplay between
the JVM and the application error-handling mechanisms with
respect to system call invocation errors.
VII. RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss work related to fault injection
and observability.
A. Fault Injection
Fault injection techniques aim at evaluating the error han-
dling mechanisms of a software system [36], [42], [52]. Fault
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injection research has heavily focused on hardware errors [26],
[32]. Another line of research work concerns the injection of
high-level software faults [25], [28], [48].
Regarding hardware-related fault injection such as bit flips,
Kanawati et al. [24] proposed FERRARI, a software system
that emulates hardware faults. Han et al. [20] designed DOC-
TOR, which focuses on injecting hardware errors and network
errors. Wei et al. [50] quantitatively evaluated the accuracy of
intermediate code level fault injection with respect to assembly
level fault injection for hardware-related errors.
Regarding high-level software error injection such as oper-
ating system faults, Lee et al. [28] presented SFIDA, which
is used to evaluate the resilience of distributed applications
on the Linux platform. Kao et al. [25] invented “FINE”, a
fault injection and monitoring tool to inject both hardware-
induced software errors and software faults. Kouwe and Tanen-
baum [48] presented HSFI, which takes execution context
information into consideration for efficient fault injection
decisions. Cotroneo et al. [14] proposed ProFIPy, a tool that
is programmable to specify different fault models using a
domain-specific language for fault injection in Python.
More related to our work, some fault injection approaches
are related to system call invocation errors. Koopman and De-
Vale [27] proposed Ballista, a testing system that generates in-
valid inputs for system call invocations in order to evaluate the
exception handling effectiveness of POSIX operating systems.
Vyukov [49] designed syzkaller, a tool that fuzzes system call
invocation inputs in order to detect kernel bugs. Amarnath
et al. [6] designed a QEMU-based fault injection framework
to evaluate the dependability of system calls with respect to
bit flips errors. Simonsson et al. [43] presented ChaosOrca, a
chaos engineering system for dockerized applications.
Regarding the error models used by the related work above,
they are either randomly generated or predefined by devel-
opers. PHOEBE exclusively focuses on injecting system call
invocation errors, and its key originality is to design realistic
error models from errors that naturally happen.
B. Chaos Engineering
Chaos engineering can be defined as doing high-level fault
injection on the production system directly [9]. Netflix’s
ChaosMonkey [12] randomly shuts down servers in production
in order to verify the whole system’s reliability against a
server crash. Then this methodology has been extended with
other kinds of errors such as the OS level and the network
errors [22], [35]. There is also application-level chaos engi-
neering research: Sheridan et al. [40] presented a fault injection
tool for cloud applications, where faults are resource stress or
service outage; Zhang et al. [51] devised ChaosMachine, a
chaos engineering system that analyzes a Java application’s
exception-handling capabilities in production.
To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing chaos
engineering approaches synthesize realistic error models based
on naturally happening errors like PHOEBE.
C. Observability
Monitoring techniques are most widely researched in the
area of observability. Grobmann and Klug [19] proposed
“PyMon”, a framework that monitors different computing ar-
chitectures with a small footprint. Povedano-Molina et al. [37]
designed DARGOS, a distributed architecture for resource
management and monitoring in cloud computing. Arora et
al. [7] presented a system called Parikshan that duplicates
traffic into a copy of the production container, enabling the use
of heavier monitoring tools without impacting the performance
in production. Chang et al. [11] developed a Kubernetes-based
monitoring platform for dynamic cloud resource provisioning.
Enes et al. [15] proposed BDWatchdog, a solution for real-time
analysis of big data frameworks and workloads that combines
per-process resource monitoring and low-level profiling.
Another popular research direction in observability is trac-
ing. Sigelman et al. [41] presented Google’s Dapper, a tracing
infrastructure with low overhead and application-level trans-
parency. Kaldor et al. [23] presented Canopy, Facebook’s end-
to-end performance tracing infrastructure that enables develop-
ers to analyze performance data in real-time. Mace et al. [31]
presented Pivot Tracing, which implements a happened-before
join operator to enhance dynamic instrumentation and causal
tracing. Instead of analyzing network requests in a distributed
system, Coppik et al. [13] proposed TrEKer, an approach
that combines static and dynamic analyses to trace error
propagation in OS kernels. Ren et al. [39] invented RepTrace,
a framework that traces system calls in order to analyze the
root causes of unreproducible builds. The traces of system call
invocations also helps anomaly detection. Liu et al. [30] pro-
posed a feature extraction method named STP that transforms
the system call sequences into frequency sequences of n-grams
in a trace to detect abnormal behavior.
Differently, PHOEBE focuses on the observability of system
call invocation errors, which is not in the scope of this
related work. Furthermore, PHOEBE synthesizes error injection
models based on the monitoring observation. The combination
of monitoring in production and fault injection is original.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented PHOEBE, a novel fault
injection framework for reliability evaluation against system
call invocation errors. The key novelty of PHOEBE is that it
synthesizes and injects realistic system call errors, meaning
that the injected errors are based on focusing on errors that
naturally happen. By evaluating PHOEBE’s functionality and
performance on two medium-sized real-world applications
(email server, file transfer), we have shown that it is able
1) to detect reliability weaknesses 2) with low overhead. In
the future, we will study the relationship between low-level
system call invocation errors and high-level Java exceptions.
This would developers to identify concrete locations in thee
application source code to fix the reliability weaknesses de-
tected by PHOEBE.
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